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INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, Kareem Serageldin was sentenced to imprisonment for 
thirty months for conspiracy to falsify books and records of a financial 
institution.1 Serageldin participated in a scheme to inflate the value of 
mortgage-backed securities owned by the Credit Suisse Group as the 
subprime credit crisis escalated in 2007 and 2008.2 The offense carried a 
maximum sentence of five years imprisonment and a maximum fine of 
$250,000 or two times the gross pecuniary gain or loss associated with the 
offense.3 The sentencing guidelines called for a prison sentence in the 
range of fifty-seven to sixty months, plus supervised release.4 However, 
Judge Hellerstein sentenced Serageldin to thirty months imprisonment and 
imposed a fine of $150,000—staying far below the presumptive 
sentencing guidelines.5 He determined that Serageldin deserved a lighter 
sentence because Serageldin was working in a climate in Credit Suisse 
where such wrongdoing was routine.6 Despite receiving a lighter sentence 
than anticipated, Serageldin still experienced an extraordinary fall from 
grace. A graduate of Yale University, earning almost seven million dollars 
a year at the height of his career, he subsequently spent his nights in a 
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prison cell the size of a basketball court with seventy others.7 Serageldin 
also earned the dubious distinction of being the only banker who was jailed 
for having some role in causing the financial crisis in the United States.8 
Acknowledging Serageldin’s lack of previous criminal convictions and 
low chance of recidivism, Judge Hellerstein mused, “[T]here’s a 
deepening mystery in my work: Why do so many good people do bad 
things?”9 
Why did Serageldin do it? This Article uses the Serageldin case as a 
vignette to highlight some of the complexities regarding the motivations 
of white-collar criminals, the importance of organizational culture in 
creating situational conditions for wrongdoing, and structural explanations 
for white-collar crime. Serageldin’s story both supports and contradicts 
various aspects of individual, organizational, and structural explanations 
for crime. In order to better understand Serageldin’s case, this Article 
engages in a multi-level analysis of explanations by integrating existing 
theories, highlighting areas of disagreement and opposing views, and 
demonstrating that some explanations are more valuable than others. 
Moreover, though, based on a single case study, there is methodological 
strength in focusing on the psychosocial processes which impact the 
individual, particularly when the data available for analysis is sufficiently 
rich as to allow for various complex narratives about this wrongdoer’s role 
in criminality.10 
This Article draws on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(SEC) complaint against Serageldin, the transcript for his plea hearing, and 
the transcript for his sentencing hearing.11 The SEC’s complaint provides 
a prosecutorial account of the fraud. It also includes actual extracts from 
Serageldin’s recorded phone calls at Credit Suisse which provide a real-
time narrative of the fraud. The court transcripts detail Serageldin’s own 
account of the fraud and give a biographical account of Serageldin’s life, 
provided by his mother, who offered character evidence on his behalf. 
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These perspectives allowed for the recasting of the SEC’s account of the 
fraud and reframed it in light of Serageldin’s personal circumstances, 
casting the banker as the fallen hero of his own narrative.12 The 
significance of these narratives is less in their content and more in the way 
they are told; they may have allowed Serageldin to deceive himself about 
the extent of his involvement in the fraud and his motivations for 
committing it. The narratives locate his individual decision within a 
corporate culture where wrongdoing was seemingly routine and within the 
structural context of a crashing securities market. Therefore, these 
contemporaneous and post-hoc accounts of the fraud are valuable because 
they facilitate the problematization of the causal explanations of this crime 
along individual, organizational, and structural lines of analysis. 
I. THE SERAGELDIN CASE AS A VIGNETTE: “PEOPLE ARE EXPECTING US 
TO MAKE MONEY” 
Kareem Serageldin was the Global Head of Structured Credit 
Trading at Credit Suisse. He had a reputation for working long hours and 
living modestly, earning himself the nickname “the investment banking 
monk.”13 The son of Egyptian immigrants of modest means, he overcame 
adversity and excelled in his studies. He completed a bachelor’s degree in 
mechanical engineering at Yale University. By the age of 33, he was 
earning $7 million a year as the Global Head of Structured Credit Trading 
for Credit Suisse. According to the SEC, he was also the architect of a 
massive fraudulent scheme to mismark mortgage-backed securities as the 
subprime credit crisis escalated in 2007 and 2008, hiding losses to make 
the securities appear more valuable than was really the case. The SEC 
alleged that Serageldin conspired with David Higgs, the Head of Hedge 
Training, and two New York-based traders who reported to Serageldin, 
Faisal Siddiqui and Salmaan Siddiqui. Serageldin and Higgs were UK 
residents but traveled to New York regularly—where the bulk of the 
violations occurred. The scheme appears to have commenced in August 
2007 and concluded in January 2008—though Serageldin disputed the 
point at which he became involved in the fraud, among other matters. The 
fraud persisted, according to the SEC, because “accurately recording the 
decline in value would cause hundreds of millions of dollars of losses, 
vaporize Defendant[’s] hopes for multi-million dollar year-end bonuses 
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and, in the case of Serageldin, imperil a highly-coveted promotion.”14 The 
fraud unfolded as follows. 
Traders must price or mark the securities they hold on their books at 
the same time every day to record their value in a fair, accurate, and 
consistent way. Credit Suisse reported the results in accordance with U.S. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and adopted 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 (SFAS 157). SFAS 
157 requires that securities be marked at a price that they can be sold at 
between market players on the measurement date. Traders should comply 
with this requirement by looking at the prices received for identical 
securities in an active market, or in the absence of those, quotes for 
identical or similar securities in inactive markets (where, for example, 
such securities are not often traded, and less information is available). 
Traders should also consider information from Credit Suisse’s trading 
desks. Traders must fairly report the price that can be achieved at the 
current time of measurement, not the likely price that can be achieved at a 
later date when a bond matures, even where the market is significantly 
depressed or in turmoil at the time of measurement. 
In August 2007, the credit markets were increasingly distressed, and 
traders in subprime mortgages were required to consult the ABX index—
which benchmarks the value of these products according to the year in 
which they are issued. The SEC alleged that as the market deteriorated, 
Serageldin and Higgs were worried about AAA-rated bonds backed by 
subprime mortgages, which they held in a trading book called ABN1. A 
reduction in the value of ABN1 would cause enormous losses because the 
portfolio contained $3.5 billion in securities. Until August 2007, the prices 
of securities in the ABN1 book were automatically priced by a service 
called the Financial Times Interactive Data (FTID). Subsequently, a new 
system was implemented to provide senior management with real-time 
price reports for securities. As a result, Serageldin and Higgs started to 
more actively monitor the prices of securities to reach daily and monthly 
P&L goals. 
The SEC extensively detailed how and when the securities were 
falsely remarked. For example, on August 29, 2007, when the FTID prices 
were downloaded to the ABN1 spreadsheet, the prices showed a loss of 
$75 million. Higgs, Salmann Siddiqui, and a trading assistant manually 
changed the prices of the securities several times on a trial and error basis 
to reduce the loss, with Salmaan Siddique noting, “Hopefully this should 
get us something close to what we need.”15 Recordings of the phone calls 
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with Credit Suisse revealed the efforts to mismark the securities to inflate 
their value: 
Trading Assistant: I’m just putting those prices in, I just wanted to 
warn you it’s not going to make what you think it’s going to 
make . . . I think basically if we put them in we probably make around 
$200,000. 
Salmaan Siddiqui: Oh, God! 
Trading Assistant: Which was not what you were expecting . . . 16 
Another recording on August 31, 2007, showed how the traders were 
attempting to hit performance targets; the trading assistant told Siddique 
that they were “going to need quite a bit more P&L . . . . Overall, in ABN 
we’re currently down about 25 now . . . David [Higgs] said we can’t be 
more than a couple down in ABN.”17 
The SEC argued that the defendants were routinely mismarking 
securities by September 2007, when “Serageldin frequently 
communicated to Higgs the specific P&L outcome he wanted.”18 The SEC 
also detailed how profits on securities from other books were being used 
to offset losses from the ABN1 book, which had been artificially marked 
up to unrealistic levels. In another recorded phone call on September 13, 
2007, a trading assistant and Serageldin discussed moving prices to best 
suit their needs: 
Trading Assistant: We’ve got 10 bucks [million] in RCV [another 
book]. We had a big [P&L] number but with Dave [Higgs] and Faisal 
we’re using it to write down some positions in ABN. 
Serageldin: Which positions? 
Trading Assistant: Just some bonds that were overpriced and to re-
mark the CMBX index to where it is. If you want it [P&L] to be a big 
number let me know what you want, then I’ll just go through it with 
Dave [Higgs], because obviously I can move things back to where 
they were. 
Serageldin: If we made a lot of money it would be nice to take it, once 
in a while.19 
On a subsequent occasion on October 17, 2007, Serageldin was 
recorded telling Higgs that P&L must be adjusted again because senior 
management expected him to make money from his trades, stating: “I want 
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to be up a little bit of money today, because everyone’s going to think 
we’re going to be up and be very surprised if we’re not.”20 The team 
continued to mismark the value of the securities in November and 
December, and Serageldin, fearing detection, acknowledged in another 
recorded phone call that the P&L was overvalued at year-end: 
Serageldin: The dollar prices of our floating rates and fixed rates 
honestly are quite high, right? 
Higgs: I agree they are quite high. 
. . . . 
Serageldin: Why can’t we lower the dollar prices on that stuff? 
Higgs: They definitely should be marked down. 
Serageldin: We should mark these down because someone is going 
to spot this. On the fixed rates we have some room, but not on the 
floating rates, we don’t. On the other desk, right, the floating rate, the 
bonds are marked below the index.21 
However, on January 7, 2008, Serageldin subsequently approved the 
year-end prices without adjusting them downwards. In a call to Higgs two 
days later, Serageldin indicated that the mismarking was necessary 
because management expected him to generate high earnings from his 
books, stating, “People are expecting us to make money. [The head of 
Credit Suisse Group’s investment bank] knows what our positions are. 
Today, we have to be up at least 10 bucks [million]. . . . I know it’s hard 
when you’ve got things that aren’t necessarily quite marked where they 
need to get marked.”22 
On February 12, 2008, Credit Suisse reported a net income of $7.12 
billion for the year 2007 and $1.16 billion in earnings for the fourth quarter 
of that year.23 Within days, detecting that the defendants had materially 
misstated the values of their securities, Credit Suisse announced on 
February 19, 2008, that its statement of earnings was inaccurate.24 A 
subsequent report on March 20, 2008, restated a reduction in earnings for 
2007 in the amount of $2.65 billion.25 The ABN1 book was written down 
by $1.3 billion, approximately half of the overall losses. That same day, 
Credit Suisse announced that it fired or suspended the traders who had 
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mismarked the securities.26 Serageldin was subsequently prosecuted in the 
Southern District of New York for mismarking securities. He pleaded 
guilty to conspiracy to falsify books and records of a financial institution 
before Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein on April 12, 2013. The offense carried 
a maximum sentence of five years of imprisonment and a maximum fine 
of $250,000 or two times the gross pecuniary gain or loss associated with 
the offense. The sentencing guidelines indicated that a prison sentence of 
fifty-seven to sixty months and a fine of $10,000 to $100,000 was 
appropriate. Judge Hellerstein, however, sentenced Serageldin to thirty 
months imprisonment and fined him $150,000. Serageldin achieved 
infamy as the only banker in the U.S. to go to jail for having some role in 
the financial crisis.27 
II. WHAT MOTIVATES WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS?: “I LOVED MY JOB” 
Gottfredson and Hirschi argue that crime is the result of a lack of 
self-control28 that arises when an individual’s bond with society is 
broken.29 Strong self-control results in better academic performance and 
greater career prospects, while a lack of self-discipline among offenders 
from an early age may result in the commission of a crime. While some 
studies link corporate executives with longer patterns of criminal 
offending,30 other empirical work suggests that white-collar criminals 
demonstrate great discipline in their studies and in their careers. For 
example, Wheeler et al. conclude that white-collar criminals tend to have 
more stable employment histories and higher educational attainment than 
that of ordinary criminals or the general public.31 Similarly, Benson and 
Moore conclude that white-collar criminals were less than half as likely to 
have a previous criminal conviction as ordinary criminals and that they 
were more likely to do well academically and be more socially adjusted.32 
Unlike Gottfredson and Hirschi, Benson and Moore conclude that white-
collar criminals have moderate self-control and that opportunity, macro-
social, economic, and organizational processes lead to crime. 
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In the corporate context, the key is not that an individual’s link to 
society is broken, but rather to what extent that individual’s connection to 
the company is maintained. Research suggests that individuals who have 
strong interpersonal attachments, investment in their careers, involvement 
in their work, and loyalty to the goals of the organization are less likely to 
commit white-collar crimes.33 The issue of organizational context, or 
corporate culture, is discussed further in the second part of this article. 
Perhaps, however, the problem is not individual self-control per se, but 
instead the lack of institutional and regulatory controls, which gives rise 
to the lack of supervision, interventions, and oversight that eventually lead 
to adverse consequences. This macro-structural issue is discussed further 
in the third part of this article. 
Scholars have also long since thought that committing a crime 
involves the logical weighing of benefits and burdens. Bentham argued 
that if the punishment is greater than the perceived benefit of the crime, 
the potential offender will be deterred. He stated, “[T]he evil of the 
punishment must be made to exceed the advantage of the offense.”34 
Becker developed this theory in a modern context.35 Crime, he suggested, 
is an economically important activity, and people are rational utility 
maximizers. Becker reasoned: 
A person commits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds 
the utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other 
activities. Some persons become ‘criminals,’ therefore, not because 
their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but because 
their benefits and costs differ.”36  
Becker also rejected “ad hoc concepts of differential association, an-
omie, and the like.”37 Instead, he noted that the calculation depended, 
among other things, on the probability of detection, apprehension, convic-
tion, and form of punishment. Offenders do not need to be perfectly ra-
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tional calculators for this theory to work; they may exercise “bounded ra-
tionality” so that they understand costs and benefits as they apply to their 
ways of thinking and beliefs.38 
Soltes argues that although white-collar criminals are thought to 
mindfully weigh the costs and benefits of their actions when deciding to 
commit crime, his personal correspondence with white-collar prisoners 
demonstrates that they are rarely so rational in practice.39 He suggests, 
“They seem to have reached their decisions to commit crimes with little 
thought or reflection. In many cases, it was difficult to say they had ever 
really ‘decided’ to commit a crime at all.”40 It was not that they were 
worried they would get caught, he suggests, but that they simply did not 
consider that they were doing anything harmful.41 This view is not peculiar 
to the white-collar crime context; other empirical research suggests that 
the vast majority of ordinary criminals give little or no thought to getting 
caught or punished.42 Nevertheless, some scholars continue to use the cost-
benefit analysis in seeking to explain why people commit white-collar 
crimes. For example, in the U.S., where “law and economics’ theories 
have come to dominate academic literature on enforcement,”43 many 
scholars expansively employ this theoretical lens to consider behavioral 
issues relating to the motivations, personalities, temperaments, and senses 
of identity of the offenders.44 
Other work has focused more specifically on the individual 
personalities and traits of white-collar criminals to explain their 
motivations behind committing crimes. Some scholars suggest that white-
collar criminals tend to be irresponsible and prone to risk-taking.45 It is 
suggested that in general, white-collar criminals are more hedonistic, 
narcissistic, and conscientious than non-criminal managers,46 though 
others have determined less conscientiousness among employees who 
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engage in theft.47 Other scholars have suggested that white-collar criminals 
usually exhibit “Type A” personalities, so they are often intelligent, 
impatient, competitive, and financially motivated.48 In a study conducted 
by Bucy et al. in which they interviewed a variety of white-collar crime 
experts, including former prosecutors, 77.8% of respondents agreed that 
white-collar criminals fall into the categorization of leader and follower.49 
Other respondents noted that white-collar criminals sometimes find 
themselves in small schemes that escalate out of control.50 Leaders are 
thought to be Type A personalities: intelligent, arrogant, cunning, 
successful, prone to take risks, aggressive, narcissistic, determined, and 
charismatic. The respondents stated, almost unanimously, that the main 
motivating factor for leaders who commit crimes is greed.51 Other 
motivating factors include a sense of entitlement, arrogance, 
competitiveness, and rationalization. Followers who commit crimes are 
considered weak, convinced of their cause, acting out of loyalty to the 
leader, or out of fear of losing their jobs. In contrast to leaders, followers 
are less confident, less aggressive, and more gullible. Others note that 
white-collar criminals are likely to be charismatic,52 exercise a desire to be 
in control,53 or have “a sense of superiority bordering on narcissism.”54 In 
some cases, they act because they fear the loss of their status and 
reputation.55 
The SEC’s complaint indicates that Serageldin was a leader in the 
scheme to mismark securities at Credit Suisse. The complaint concludes 
that the “defendants’ fraudulent scheme was initiated by Kareem 
Serageldin.”56 This is evidenced by numerous occasions where Serageldin 
instructed his subordinates, David Higgs, Faisal Siddique, and Salmaan 
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Siddiqui, to mismark the values of securities, clearly indicating that 
Serageldin played a prominent role in orchestrating the scheme. The 
complaint states, “Serageldin frequently communicated to Higgs the 
specific P&L outcome he wanted. Higgs, in turn, directed Faisal Siddiqui 
or Salmaan Siddiqui to mark the book in a manner that would achieve the 
desired P&L.”57 The SEC suggested Serageldin was financially motivated 
because the decline in the value of the securities, in the absence of 
mismarking, “[W]ould cause hundreds of millions of dollars of losses, 
vaporize Defendant’s hopes for multi-million dollar year-end bonuses and, 
in the case of Serageldin, imperil a highly-coveted promotion.”58 Quoting 
Serageldin, the SEC argues that he responded to expectations from higher-
ups to generate profit: “Serageldin stated that he needed a more favorable 
P&L result because senior management expected him to make money: ‘I 
want to be up a little bit of money today, because everyone’s going to think 
we’re going up and be very surprised if we’re not.’”59 On another occasion, 
Serageldin stated that “people are expecting us to make money. [The head 
of Credit Suisse Group’s investment bank] knows what our positions are. 
Today, we have to be up at least 10 bucks [million].”60 These forms of 
performance pressures—the need to “hit the numbers,” meet growth 
targets, and respond to organizational pressures—are well established as 
reported causal explanations for white-collar crime.61 
Contrary to the views of the SEC, Serageldin explained that neither 
money nor a promotion motivated him; instead, Serageldin insisted, “The 
motivation, your Honor, was to protect my reputation at the bank. At the 
time there was a lot of market turmoil, so I was protecting my reputation 
in the bank.”62 The court seemed skeptical of this explanation because 
losses were widespread at Credit Suisse, so Serageldin could not have 
suffered any more reputational loss than anyone else. Serageldin’s view, 
however, was that he was particularly admired for his ability to navigate 
turbulent market conditions. He noted, “[W]ithin the bank I had a 
reputation to be able to manage these positions in a very difficult market 
while everyone else was losing money . . . I was trying to maintain that 
reputation.”63 He explained that it was not about money. Furthermore, this 
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book with inflated market valuations was merely one of approximately 
thirty that he oversaw, and the mismarking constituted less than five 
percent of the trades he supervised. The inflation of the book did not 
translate to substantially increased earnings for him. Counsel for 
Serageldin was keen to differentiate Serageldin’s case from other 
mismarking cases in which traders tried to hide ever-greater mounting 
losses, preserve their profitability to garner compensation, or affect a 
particular position tied to a big payout for a trader. Credit Suisse withheld 
$25 million in compensation from Serageldin, $20 million of which was 
deferred compensation for work completed prior to the mismarking in 
question ever began. Serageldin claimed he lost far more than he could 
ever have hoped to gain. 
Contrary to the SEC’s complaint and the audio recordings, 
Serageldin also claimed he was not the architect of the mismarking; he 
was a follower, not a leader. According to Serageldin, he discovered 
mismarking was already taking place, and if anything, followed his staff 
into the misconduct. In particular, Serageldin argues that he became aware 
some traders under his supervision were mismarking their positions when 
he received a report in late 2007 that aggregated data showing weighted 
average prices for books of securities.64 Serageldin claims he suspected 
there was a significant gap in the valuations in the report and the price the 
bonds could actually be sold for in the market. Serageldin joined the 
conspiracy: 
After learning that these men [the other defendants] had been 
mismarking Credit Suisse’s records of certain bonds at inflated levels 
above where they could be sold in the market . . . I allowed it to 
continue, and I agreed to allow additional false records to be 
generated. I joined the conspiracy in the hope of concealing the 
mismarks and the devaluation of these bonds.65 
As such, Serageldin described his role in the fraud in passive terms. 
He learned of the fraud, allowed it, followed it, and joined it, but he did 
not lead it. Nevertheless, the court was also skeptical of Serageldin’s 
claims on this point. If white-collar criminals are either leaders or 
followers, Judge Hellerstein determined:  
[H]e was a leader, and when things are run around you, there’s no 
necessity for the leader to follow suit. Someone has got to stand up 
for what’s right. And when he doesn’t stand up for what’s right, when 
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a person doesn’t do what’s right and starts doing criminal things, he’s 
a criminal.66 
It is not entirely clear, however, notwithstanding the court’s view that 
mismarking was systemic in Credit Suisse, whether the bank was actually 
willfully blind to the mismarking in the Serageldin case. The court noted, 
for example, that the bank could have compared the mismarked book 
against other books to see that there was inflation.67 Pursuing this line of 
inquiry further, the court asked Serageldin if it was clear whether the bank 
knew that the bonds were mismarked, stating: “[Y]ou must have believed 
that management would either have accepted the deception or closed their 
eyes to the deception?”68 The court also asked why the auditors had not 
caught the mismarking.69 Serageldin appeared evasive in his replies: “I do 
not know why the process did not capture the mismarks. I guess the 
process was an imperfect process . . . .”70 Serageldin explained that the 
traders recorded the market value of their positions at the end of each day 
without any objective evidence of the valuations, noting, “[I]t is the say-
so of the trader and there is obviously some subjectivity in the matter.”71 
Serageldin’s evasiveness on this point may stem from the fact that he was 
downplaying his attempts to frustrate Credit Suisse’s protocols to reduce 
the risk of detection. 
Serageldin’s strategies to circumvent Credit Suisse’s protocols are 
detailed in the SEC’s complaint, which demonstrated that Serageldin was 
clearly calculating in his decision-making processes to mismark the 
securities. For example, in order to resist scrutiny from the Price Testing 
group at Credit Suisse, which reviewed the valuations assigned to 
securities by traders, the defendants requested third party dealers to verify 
their prices. These assessments, however, were not independent because 
the dealers merely valued the securities at prices that the defendants 
themselves requested.72 On another occasion, the SEC noted that 
“Serageldin instructed Higgs and another trader to select four positions 
that Price Testing could not test and to increase the prices on those 
positions ‘to make back the money’ that Price Testing was questioning.”73 
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Furthermore, when the securities had been priced too high, Serageldin 
stated: “We should mark these down because someone is going to spot 
this.”74 It is also clear, according to the SEC, that Serageldin and his co-
conspirators knew they were engaging in wrongdoing. The SEC stated: 
By the end of 2007, Defendants were in possession of ample market 
data showing that their bonds were grossly overvalued. Despite freely 
discussing that “housing was going down the tubes,” and 
acknowledging that their bonds were overpriced and should be 
marked down, Defendants kept the bonds priced at falsely high levels 
at year-end.75 
All of this, the SEC noted, showed that Serageldin knew that what 
he was doing was wrong and that by attempting to deceive the bank and 
reduce his risk of detection he was clearly calculating in his decision-
making processes. 
Serageldin managed, however, to paint a very different picture of his 
decision-making processes. Echoing Soltes’s view that white-collar 
criminals do not seem to give much thought or reflection to the 
wrongdoing, Serageldin claimed that he didn’t consider the costs or 
benefits of his actions. It seemed, in fact, that it had never occurred to 
Serageldin that he would ever commit a crime. Serageldin stated, “Your 
Honor, today is the most difficult day of my life. I never imagined I would 
be standing here awaiting sentencing for a crime.”76 He acknowledged that 
when he realized the mismarking were occurring, “the right thing to do 
would have been to stop, correct and address the misconduct. I recognize 
that this was a crucial moment of my life and I see that I failed miserably 
in the decisions I made at this time.”77 Moreover, Serageldin’s submission 
to the court, and that of his mother, allowed him to show that he did not 
seem to share the negative personality traits most associated with leaders 
or white-collar criminals, though it was clear he was intelligent and 
determined. At just thirty-three years of age, Serageldin was managing his 
team at Credit Suisse, a position that came with a lot of responsibility. This 
achievement was even more impressive because Serageldin came from a 
family of immigrants and felt he had to work harder than everyone else to 
get to the same position and to be accepted. To provide insight to her son’s 
character, Serageldin’s mother explained that the family moved from 
Egypt to America when Serageldin was six years old. The family struggled 
to make ends meet, and Serageldin internalized the importance of hard 
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work. Bullied at school, Serageldin felt he had to work twice as hard as 
everyone else to receive the respect and approval of his peers. It was not 
about money, but about “winning that respect and approval that were so 
hard, the acceptance that were so hard to come by as he was growing up.”78 
These explanations resonated with the court. Judge Hellerstein 
stated, “I too am a son of immigrants who came to the United States to 
find an opportunity that they never would have had had they not 
immigrated.”79 Moreover, contrary to the explanatory factors outlined by 
Gottfredson and Hirschi, Serageldin exercised considerable self-control 
from a young age. Serageldin also acknowledged, “I always believed by 
working harder than anyone I could succeed at almost anything. That was 
the case throughout my education, as well as my time at Credit Suisse. I 
was proud of the reputation I built at the bank. Your Honor, I loved my 
job.”80 
III. “A SMALL PIECE OF AN OVERALL EVIL CLIMATE”: WHAT ROLE 
DOES ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE PLAY? 
In an attempt to explain why people commit crime, some experts 
have examined the role that society plays. Sutherland, an early pioneer in 
the study of white-collar crime, argued that crime was a learned behavior. 
Within intimate social groups, there is a process of communication and 
learning by interaction, through which people share their motivations, 
drives, and rationalizations.81 Various rewards and punishments, including 
financial incentives, reputational issues, and power, may also influence 
behavior.82 This theory was called differential association because it 
specified that the tendency to commit crime depended on the frequency 
and intensity of associations with other criminals.83 Cressey further 
developed the theory in an empirical study of embezzlers.84 He noted that 
embezzlers generally encountered financial difficulties that could not be 
shared but which could be solved privately in a manner which could be 
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verbalized as compatible with their own standards of morality. Cressey’s 
work demonstrated that wrongdoing is not necessarily the result of 
belonging to a criminally deviant subgroup or being immersed in a 
criminal environment; those engaged in wrongdoing will often be law 
abiding, as will their colleagues, but they rationalize or “neutralize” their 
wrongdoing.85 In Cressey’s study, embezzlers were more likely to tell 
themselves that they were just borrowing the money, that the money was 
really theirs anyway, or that their actions were aberrations that did not 
define them. They neutralized their conduct not merely to explain it, but 
to explain it away.86 Langevoort has observed that this form of 
rationalizing or neutralizing wrongdoing is not uncommon in 
“organizational hierarchies.”87 Cressey’s tripartite classifications of 
pressure, opportunity, and rationalization were subsequently developed 
into an internationally prominent model known as the fraud triangle, which 
has since been adapted and developed further to explain various forms of 
fraud not restricted to embezzlement.88 
Cultures of either compliance with or resistance to regulation 
develop within companies.89 With regard to the latter, Clinard and Yeager 
argue that the key to understanding how the corporate environment creates 
conditions for criminality is to drop the fiction that the corporation is a 
person and to embrace the reality that it is a complex organization where 
responsibility is diffused and fragmented.90 The organization is 
“criminogenic” when its internal structures, rather than people’s 
personality traits or motivations, play some part in generating crime. 
Drawing on empirical work on tax evasion and anti-competitive 
practices,91 Needleman and Needleman say that systems are crime 
coercive when they compel people to commit crimes for corporate profit 
“in which the individual system member is essentially a pawn, with few 
choices and few defenses against criminogenic pressures.”92 In his 
empirical work, Clinard determined that middle managers were most 
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likely to be influenced by the ethical standards set by top management, 
and that middle managers responded to the pressures exerted by top 
management. Ethical standards were compromised in order to sustain 
profits and reduce costs. Pressure may come from above to perform well 
for the company so that “[u]ndue corporate pressures upon middle 
management may lead to their becoming engaged in illegal or unethical 
behavior.”93 
Research has led experts to have a better understanding of how 
cultural immersion can influence people and how people respond to 
authority. Asch’s perception-based study showed that individuals were 
willing to give obviously incorrect answers to simple tasks, subjugating 
their decision-making processes due to a group dynamic.94 In Milgram’s 
famous experiment, participants were willing to administer severe electric 
shocks, on instructions from an apparently legitimate source, 
demonstrating that people were often willing to compromise their own 
moral standards and follow authority.95 In the Stanford Prison Experiment, 
Zimbardo demonstrated that situational contexts and group dynamics 
facilitated the commission of torture of prisoners by guards.96 In doing so, 
Zimbardo displaced “the long-held notion of the ‘bad apple’ with that of 
the ‘bad barrel’: the idea that the social setting and the system contaminate 
the individual, rather than the other way around.”97 Subsequent research 
has questioned the ethical underpinnings of these studies,98 and the ability 
the replicate the results,99 though the conclusions remain generally 
accepted.100 Moreover, other empirical work has demonstrated that even 
when behavior is directed to serve organizational goals, information about 
wrongdoing is not always shared with the top brass in companies, so that 
the knowledge of crime or unethical behavior is pushed down in 
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organizations, along with the responsibility for it.101 This is especially true 
when top executives pressure middle-management into achieving 
particular results, while being willfully blind as to how those results are 
achieved.102 
The corporate structure may still facilitate crime even when the 
crimes damage the goals of the organization. This is likely to occur when 
the steps to prevent or control crime are considered more damaging to the 
organization than the wrongdoing itself. In those circumstances, crimes 
are “an unwelcome but unavoidable cost of doing business.”103 Within the 
securities industry, for example, Needleman and Needleman see: 
a market pattern in which flow is everything, and the intrinsic value 
of the basic commodity almost irrelevant. . . . More importantly, 
whatever losses they occasionally suffer through fraud (limited by 
insurance in any case) are less significant in terms of total profit than 
the benefits of keeping the overall flow of commerce unimpeded.104 
If corporate culture can compel or tempt people into committing 
white-collar crime, there is also the possibility that ambitious people, with 
a high tolerance for risk-taking and little regard for corporate ethics, prefer 
to work for firms with a criminogenic culture.105 People may “self-select” 
themselves to work in those companies. 
In Serageldin’s case, Judge Hellerstein determined that mismarking 
in Credit Suisse was a routine part of the corporate culture there. Judge 
Hellerstein stated: 
He was in a place where there was a climate that made it conducive 
to what he did. The bank was, as you call it, mismarking, but showing 
false profits much more extensively than Mr. Serageldin was doing. 
Mr. Serageldin’s role was a small piece of an overall evil climate 
within the bank and with many other banks.106 
According to the prosecution, the overstatements Serageldin oversaw 
amounted to one hundred million dollars, a small portion of the $2.65 
billion in losses that Credit Suisse misstated.107 A subsequent report later 
                                                     
 101. ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988). 
 102. J. S. Nelson, Disclosure-Driven Crime, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487 (2018). 
 103. Martin L. Needleman & Carolyn Needleman, Organizational Crime: Two Models of 
Criminogenesis, 20 SOC. Q. 517, 521 (1979) (italics omitted). 
 104. Id. at 524 (italics omitted). 
 105. Robert Apel & Raymond Paternoster, Understanding “Criminogenic” Corporate Culture: 
What White-Collar Crime Researchers Can Learn from Studies of the Adolescent Employment–Crime 
Relationship, in THE CRIMINOLOGY OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 15–33 (2009). 
 106. Sentencing Hearing at 9, United States v. Serageldin, 1:12-CR-00090 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 
2013). 
 107. Id. at 37–38. 
2020] Why Do Good People Do Bad Things? 543 
concluded that the over-statement was actually closer to $37 million,108 
“slightly more than one percent of the bank’s total restatement.”109 Even 
working with the $100 million figure, Judge Hellerstein concluded “that 
there was either a terrible climate in the bank because people tend to know 
what other people are doing. And Mr. Serageldin’s crime, and it is a crime, 
was a crime that was duplicated by many others in many other 
departments.”110 On this basis, the Court refused to order any restitution 
for Credit Suisse, the apparent victim in the case. Judge Hellerstein stated, 
“I think the bank, having created a climate in which Mr. Serageldin has 
operated and not having shown to what extent, if at all, the bonuses paid 
to him would not otherwise have been paid, is not entitled to restitution.”111 
IV. “THE ONLY PERSON SINGLED OUT IN A CRIMINAL CASE FOR . . . THE 
CREDIT CRISIS”—WHAT STRUCTURAL FACTORS INFLUENCE  
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME? 
Having outlined individual and environmental explanations, this 
section considers structural factors in crime causation. Some theorists 
argue that the structure of society is itself dysfunctional, and that this 
produces dysfunction at a micro level.112 For example, Wacquant has 
concluded that structural factors offer the best explanations of crime, 
arguing that “hyper-ghettoes” emerged in the USA because of changes 
over the course of the late twentieth century to the labor market (when 
factories moved abroad and respectable working-class jobs became more 
elusive), housing policy (which concentrated social housing and social 
disadvantage in particular communities), and welfare policy (which did 
not provide enough to live on) over the course of the late twentieth 
century.113 These changes on the macro or “structural” level impacted how 
people lived in disadvantaged communities, drawing attention to “the role 
of the state as a stratifying and classifying agency that wields a dominant 
influence on the social and symbolic order of the city.”114 
Similarly, in a detailed case study on organizational wrongdoing, 
Vaughan argued that the explosion of NASA’s space shuttle, Challenger, 
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was “socially organized and systematically produced by social 
structures . . . embedded in the banality of organizational life.”115 In that 
case, production pressures and economic constraints which arose from the 
broader political environment combined with managerial wrongdoing to 
induce a series of incremental mistakes; risk-taking and danger became 
normalized, institutionalized, and aligned with organizational goals. In 
doing so, Vaughan “shifts our attention from individual causal 
explanations to the structure of power and the power of structure and 
culture—factors that are difficult to identify and untangle yet have great 
impact on decision making in organizations.”116 As recognized by 
Vaughan, to understand why people commit white-collar crimes, “we 
must conceptualize individual action within its layered context—Persons 
as actors, the organization as a system of action, and the environment as 
the system of action within which the organization acts.”117 In this section, 
macrostructural factors are discussed as giving rise to an environment 
where there was a lack of effective supervision, intervention, and 
oversight, in which the Government created the conditions for 
irresponsible risk-taking in the banking sector. 
In relation to white-collar crime, the structural factors which 
influence white-collar crime may include the lack of regulation, the wide 
use of alternatives to punishment, and the valorization of the economy in 
neoliberal societies, among others.118 Deregulation, a lack of credible 
regulatory oversight, inadequate corporate governance, and poor risk 
management have been identified as structural causes of the financial 
crash in the US.119 The deregulatory movement and its policies have a long 
historical trajectory, taking hold in the 1970s and 1980s when the 
importance of the New Deal restrictions and the impact of the Great 
Depression were no longer felt as keenly, ultimately triggering another 
boom-bust regulatory cycle. The separation of commercial and investment 
banking created by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was weakened in the 
1980s and 1990s through expansive interpretations of the “business of 
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banking” by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),120 in 
part by pressure exerted by the banking industry,121 before being repealed 
by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, considered by some to be a 
significant factor contributing to the financial crash.122 Restrictions on the 
geographical operations of banks were also loosened and lifted; banks 
were able to form branches with greater ease within and across state 
lines.123 The erosion of interstate banking restrictions combined with the 
erosion of the Glass-Steagall constraints led to the merger and acquisition 
of banks into what is now known as systemically important financial 
institutions.124 
Moreover, legislative measures like the Tax Reform Act in 1986, 
which had already begun in the 1970s, facilitated a process known as 
securitization. This process allowed banks to sell their loans to Special 
Purpose Vehicles which bundled debts together to sell as securities, 
backed by assets like mortgages, the kind Serageldin was selling.125 These 
mortgage backed securities were thought to be particularly safe products 
because they diffused the risk of default among many parties and credit 
rating agencies that provided positive evaluations of them, not least 
because underwriters could shop around for the best rating.126 
In 2000, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act allowed for the 
“over the counter” dealing of derivatives (contracts whose values were 
derived from other assets, securities, etc.) so they could be sold privately 
among traders and not on an exchange, thereby inhibiting transparency 
and oversight from regulators.127 Though derivatives had long since been 
a feature of the financial services landscape, the existing market in 
derivatives grew and a new type of derivative, the credit default swap, 
proliferated. This allowed investors to ‘insure’ against the risk of default 
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on a loan in return for a premium. Investors were swapping or hedging that 
risk in return for making a payment, which allowed them to limit their 
exposure, and to speculate further.128 These derivatives would “allow 
market actors to take positions that magnify losses, heighten risk 
concentration in the financial system, raise the vulnerability in the 
financial system, and raise the vulnerability of interconnected financial 
firms to cascading liquidity and counterparty credit problems.”129 
Moreover, banks were highly leveraged because they funded themselves 
more through short-term debt that could be withdrawn by providers in a 
deteriorating market, thereby creating conditions for a run.130 
Meanwhile, some have argued that government policies helped fuel 
a property bubble, premised on fragile security, and ultimately contributed 
to a credit crisis.131 For example, the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1992 placed a positive obligation on government 
sponsored entities (GSEs), like Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac, to support the 
mortgage market and finance affordable home ownership by buying 
mortgages from lenders so they could use these funds to give more loans. 
The legislation required GSEs to buy a percentage of mortgages provided 
to low- and middle-income borrowers. The Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) set these targets, raising them from 42% in 
1997 to 50% in 2001 and again to 55% in 2007.132 In addition, 
underwriting standards fell so that loans were increasingly given without 
proper supporting documents from the borrower (liar loans), or were given 
to borrowers who had no income, job, or assets (NINJA loans).133 
Commenting on the fragile security underpinning these loans, the FCIC 
would later comment, “As a nation, we set aggressive homeownership 
goals. . . . Yet the government failed to ensure that the philosophy of 
opportunity was being matched by the practical realities on the ground.”134 
In addition, after the 911 terrorist attacks and the bursting of the dot-com 
bubble, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates to stimulate the economy and 
encourage home sales with “mortgage interest rates that are at lows not 
seen in decades . . . .”135 
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Gathering these threads together, the government facilitated 
deregulation and eroded the division between commercial and investment 
banking so that banks could not just garner earnings arising from the 
interest on mortgages, but could also securitise and trade those mortgages 
for greater profit. The government, through its various branches, lowered 
interest rates to encourage mortgage lending; encouraged banks to lend to 
borrowers of modest means at higher risk of default; and permitted, 
through the absence of regulation, dispensation of mortgages through 
weak underwriting standards. Gerding has called this phenomenon the 
regulatory instability hypothesis, a context in which “strong forces act to 
decay financial regulations at the precise moment when they are most 
needed—when markets boom, investors and financial institutions exercise 
less care and take on more risk and leverage, and financial crisis looms.”136 
It was at this moment that regulations were needed the most because 
banks, in turn, seem to have used subprime mortgages of questionable 
creditworthiness as collateral for highly leveraged securities that were 
marketed as exceptionally creditworthy, thereby transforming “a sow’s ear 
into a silk purse.”137 When the property market subsequently declined in 
the mid-2000s, and people defaulted on their mortgages, credit rating 
agencies downgraded mortgage-backed securities, and banks lost billions 
on those assets. It was in this context that Serageldin found himself in 2007 
and early 2008, under pressure to generate profits while trading assets 
which were declining in value. 
In addition to the state of the financial services sector, the manner in 
which supervision and enforcement activities are conducted is also 
important. Credible oversight and enforcement can increase the risk of 
detection of wrongdoing and may discourage wrongdoers from engaging 
in irresponsible risk taking in the financial services sector.138 Enforcement 
is also contingent on the social, political, and economic context which 
prevails at that time.139 Unsurprisingly, perhaps, a political context which 
favors light-touch regulation will also impact the relative intrusiveness of 
regulators and their approaches.140 For example, the Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006, Alan Greenspan, was known for 
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favoring light-touch regulation, having argued that leaving the market to 
its own devices was in itself a form of regulation, used that proposition in 
public speeches to ask if Government intervention did more harm than 
good.141 It is the SEC, however, that maintains a more central role in 
enforcing federal securities laws. In doing so, it is known for preferring 
compliance-orientated strategies to punitive ones and tends to view 
referrals for criminal prosecution as a last resort. 
Research into the SEC’s enforcement practices has long since noted 
its preference for addressing cases internally, and a reluctance to refer 
cases for prosecution.142 This preference for civil and administrative 
sanctions is understandable; they provide fast ways of addressing harm 
and resolving problems, allow the SEC to resolve cases without resort to 
the criminal justice system, and involve lower levels of proof and evidence 
than required in criminal cases. It has been found, however, that “the 
misdeeds most vulnerable to criminal sanctions are also most likely to 
escape legal action entirely[,]” raising questions as to whether the SEC 
addresses wrongdoing proportionately and effectively.143 In addition, a 
recent empirical analysis of SEC civil and administrative enforcement data 
from 2005–2007 found that individuals in big firms fare better in 
enforcement actions than those in smaller firms because (1) the actions 
taken against large entities are less likely to be accompanied by 
enforcement actions against individuals, and (2) because individuals at big 
firms face less punitive sanctions.144 It “demonstrates a systematic lack of 
action against individual violators in high-profile cases . . . ,”145 again 
raising the question of whether its enforcement actions are optimal in 
deterring misconduct. 
Recent criticisms have questioned why the SEC did not detect the 
major multi-billion fraud committed by Bernie Madoff, notwithstanding 
numerous warning signs.146 Others have criticized its “abject failure to 
monitor the financial crimes and shenanigans engaged in by investment 
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banks and other irresponsible entities whose reckless behavior collectively 
triggered what has become known as ‘the Great Economic Meltdown.’”147 
In its defense, the SEC has protested that it operated with smaller budgets 
in the lead-up to the crisis but was expected to oversee an expanded 
securities market with more complex financial operations. Testifying 
before Congress, the Chairperson of the SEC, Mary Schapiro, stated: 
The agency has suffered a significant decline in staffing levels, due 
to several years of flat or declining budgets. Between 2005 and 2007, 
the agency lost 10 percent of its employees . . . . Yet as the SEC staff 
has declined, the securities markets grew dramatically. For example, 
since 2005 the number of investment advisers registered with the 
Commission has increased by 32 percent and their assets under 
management have jumped by over 70 percent (to now more than $40 
trillion).148 
The DOJ, which monopolizes the power to criminally prosecute 
federal crimes at the federal level, has also been criticized for addressing 
the wrongdoing arising from the financial crisis through negotiated 
settlement agreements rather than criminal prosecutions.149 Despite 
appearing remarkably punitive due to the very high financial penalties 
secured in these agreements, these settlements have been severely 
criticized for failing to deliver individual accountability and for lacking 
sufficient judicial oversight. Garrett has noted that “[i]n about two-thirds 
of the cases involving deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements 
and public corporations, the company was punished, but no employees 
were prosecuted.”150 
The general reluctance to prosecute bankers for the financial crash 
has precipitated academic discussion and comparisons with criminal 
justice responses to financial crises in the past. For example, while 
deregulatory policies and a lack of credible oversight are identified as 
common factors in the financial crisis of 2008 and the S&L crisis in the 
1980s, the S&L crisis generated a stiff criminal justice response, unlike 
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the recent financial crisis.151 As noted by Pontell et al., “[T]he savings and 
loan crisis of the 1980s resulted in over a thousand convictions of thrift 
executives and others at, or near the top of the corporate food chain.”152 
Serageldin, however, appears to have been the only banker of any seniority 
to have been prosecuted for any role in the financial crisis of 2008, and 
even then, some have suggested that he was, at best, a middle manager in 
Credit Suisse.153 
Counsel for Serageldin also noted that few other cases of wrongdoing 
arising from the financial crisis appear to have been detected and 
prosecuted by the Department of Justice. This trial was an exceptional one 
“[b]ecause he is really by some counts the only person that has been 
singled out in a criminal case for what some people call the credit crisis, 
financial crisis . . . .”154 Counsel for Serageldin observed “that he may go 
to prison here today is a huge unwarranted disparity to what the other 
people who likely were mismarking portfolios across Wall Street and 
maybe, as your Honor observed, within Credit Suisse.”155 The Court was 
unimpressed with this argument, noting: “It reminds me of five robbers 
complaining that the sixth did not get caught.”156 His counsel countered, 
“In this point, Mr. Serageldin is the sixth robber. The other five seem to 
have gotten away.”157 Serageldin is not the villain of the piece, but rather, 
the victim of a broader structural context, prosecuted “for something that 
happened when the credit world sort of came down around Mr. 
Serageldin’s head . . . .”158 
In summation, this section sought to locate individual acts and 
organizational culture within the broader regulatory environment. In 
particular, it noted the argument, well canvassed in the literature, that the 
State created the conditions for Serageldin’s fraud because legislative 
initiatives eroded the separation of commercial and investment banking. 
In the past, banks had generated profit from interest on mortgages, but now 
they could securitize those mortgages and earn much higher profits from 
trading them. Deregulatory initiatives weakened the SEC and resourcing 
issues constrained its operations. Low interest rates set by the Federal 
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Reserve helped to stimulate a housing boom, and the government 
encouraged banks to give loans to those of more modest means, 
stimulating the subprime market. Weaker underwriting standards were 
permitted so that mortgages were offered to those at an increased risk of 
being unable to repay the loan. The level of supervision and oversight by 
regulatory authorities was low, and individuals in large institutions were 
unlikely to be punished severely and very unlikely to be prosecuted. 
It is in this broader structural context that Serageldin found himself 
in 2007 and early 2008. He was trading mortgage-backed securities as the 
subprime crisis escalated. He experienced personal and organizational 
pressure to generate profits while trading assets that were declining in 
value. He mismarked assets in the hopes that he might trade his way out 
of difficulties. Broader macro-level forces informed micro-level decisions 
made by Serageldin as an individual working in an organization. In this 
context, “the competitive environment creates the structural impetus for 
misconduct; organizational characteristics provide opportunities; and the 
regulatory environment, systematically failing because of structurally 
engendered constraints, encourages individuals to respond to competitive 
pressures by taking advantage of the socially organized opportunities for 
deviance that are available in organizations.”159 This is not to say that 
individuals do not exercise power in making their own choices. For 
example, though they may have experienced competitive pressures 
differently, some people at Credit Suisse did not mismark securities 
despite working in the same context as Serageldin. Nevertheless, this 
section illustrates how white-collar crime can be informed by a macro-
level context, such that dysfunction at a broader regulatory level trickles 
down to organizational and individual levels. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal scholars have long since recognized that the “good man” and 
the “bad man” have different reasons for obeying the law.160 Holmes 
suggested that the good man will obey the law because he thinks it’s the 
right thing to do, but the bad man “who cares nothing for an ethical rule 
which is believed and practised by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to 
care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep 
out of jail if he can.”161 He continues,  
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as 
a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such 
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knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his 
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the 
vaguer sanctions of conscience.162 
While most scholarship is concerned with the bad man, some 
scholarship, particularly in the field of compliance, considers matters from 
the perspective of the good man. Some people will obey the law simply 
because it is the right thing to do, “not because they calculate that the costs 
of crime exceed its benefits; crime is simply off their deliberative 
agenda . . . .”163 It is also recognized that some people will obey the law 
when they think it is fairly applied and maps onto their values.164 Feldman, 
for example, suggests that there are two types of good people who break 
the law. First, there are the good people who deceive themselves into 
genuinely believing that their actions are not wrongful or immoral. 
Second, there are people who know what they are doing is wrong but can 
rationalize their wrongdoing to preserve their views of themselves as 
generally law-abiding people. These two types of good people exhibit 
different levels of self-awareness and different motivations for complying 
with the law.165 
Serageldin does not appear to conform to the idea of a “bad man” 
who obeys the law because he fears punishment. From his own 
perspective, it seems that he never really thoughtfully considered the costs 
and benefits of his actions, that he did not consider getting caught, or even 
that he was consciously thinking that he was committing crimes. He 
describes himself as a driven, diligent worker who does not lack self-
control. He said he was not motivated by profit but committed his crimes 
to protect his reputation in Credit Suisse as someone who could navigate 
turbulent financial conditions with relative ease. 
Moreover, Serageldin was strongly influenced by the context and 
culture in which he was immersed, in which Credit Suisse arguably made 
insufficient efforts to detect apparently widespread and routine 
mismarking. Misconduct was made easier by structural issues: not caused 
by a bad apple, but by a bad barrel. Serageldin’s wrongdoing within Credit 
Suisse took place within a broader deregulatory or light-touch regulatory 
environment, which disfavored intrusive, harsh enforcement, and that 
generated the conditions for dysfunction at individual and organizational 
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levels. Some suggest that culture is neither what is written into policy 
documents, nor how people interpret those policies in practice; culture is 
what happens when no one is watching. If so, this raises the question of 
whether Credit Suisse was willfully blind to its inner workings, thereby 
creating generative conditions for crime. The importance of this 
observation is that it reminds us that crime is not aberrational; good people 
can do bad things when those things are routinized, rationalized, and 
networked as normal. Moreover, when operating within a culture where 
wrongdoing is routine and regulatory controls are insufficient, wrongdoers 
may not be able to accurately evaluate both why they did such actions, or 
to fully appreciate the unethical nature of those actions so that they 
maintain their positive images of themselves as moral, law-abiding 
persons. In regard to other aspects of their lives, they may really be those 
persons. At the time Serageldin committed his crimes, he seemed to 
recognize that his actions were unethical, that he made mistakes, and that 
he exercised poor judgment, but he also sought to explain how his chronic 
pattern of offending was aberrational. He falls within Feldman’s second 
classification, the good man who knows his conduct is wrong but seeks to 
rationalize, neutralize, and explain it away. 
 
